Another Problem for Tax Deeds
Bruce A. McDonald
Some days it must be no fun being a circuit court clerk, I’m
sure. You have to watch all these statutory requirements in all
kinds of cases, and you do your best to follow the law
precisely. Then the supreme courts of Florida and the U.S. hand
down decisions that invalidate a lot of judicial sales you’ve
conducted carefully under a statute by declaring the statute
unconstitutional as applied. That must be like a contractor
following the plans and specs to the letter, only to be told
that they were given the wrong address for the house. Not your
fault but still not a good feeling.
That’s what Florida clerks are experiencing with tax sales under
chapter 197, Fla. Stat. Until 2005 successful bidders in tax
sales in which the former owner was not given actual notice
could rely on Alwani v. Slocum, 540 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1989), rev. denied 548 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1989) which
rejected a challenge to a tax deed issued after notice was sent
to the wrong address but according to the statute. Alwani
has been followed in other cases, including Kidder v. Cirelli,
821 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).
However, Judge Charles M. Harris, dissenting in Kidder,
correctly predicted the constitutional cliff over which reliance
on the tax deed statute was going to fall: “The majority holds
that the owner's failure to know and to notify the tax collector
that the tax collector's records reflect a defective address for
the owner of a particular piece of property forfeits such
owner's constitutional right to notice in the event a tax sale
is scheduled."
That same Fifth District changed its tune in the en banc
decision in Rosado v. Vosilla, 909 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2005), in which it followed Judge Harris’ argument in
Kidder and held that statutory notice did not meet due
process standards. It certified conflict with Alwani.
However, in April, 2006, before the Rosado-Alwani
conflict could be resolved, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its
opinion 5-3 in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. __, 164 L.Ed.2d
415 (2006), holding that when a mailed notice of a tax sale is
returned unclaimed, the state, as a mater of due process, must
take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to
the property owner before selling the property, if it is
practicable to do so. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
wrote:
[W]e do not think that a person who actually desired
to inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of
a house he owns would do nothing when a certified letter
sent to the owner is returned unclaimed. If the Commissioner
prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent taxpayers,
handed them to the postman, and then watched as the
departing postman accidentally dropped the letters down a
storm drain, one would certainly expect the Commissioner's
office to prepare a new stack of letters and send them
again. No one "desirous of actually informing" the owners
would simply shrug his shoulders as the letters disappeared
and say "I tried." Failing to follow up would be
unreasonable, despite the fact that the letters were
reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipients when
delivered to the postman."
When the Jones v. Flower opinion was issued, the
Florida Supreme Court was nearing the end of its deliberation on
resolving the conflict between Rosado and Alwani.
Justice Pariente, writing for a unanimous state Supreme Court,
relied in heavy part on the Jones decision, quoting the
“postman” language quoted above. The opinion affirmed the ruling
of the Fifth District in Rosado, finding that strict
application of the notice statute by the clerk of court under
the facts of that case did not meet due process scrutiny.
“We conclude, as did the Fifth District, that the notice sent
to the Rosados was not reasonably calculated to apprise them of
the tax deed sale. Under the "practicalities and peculiarities"
of this case, . . . due process required that the clerk of court
take additional reasonable steps to notify the Rosados of the
tax deed sale prior to selling their property, such as checking
to determine whether a change of address had been submitted. As
in Jones, the fact that due process required the clerk of court
to take additional reasonable steps to provide notice is
measured against the backdrop of such a significant and
irreversible prospect as the loss of a house.”
So now the law is clear, which is that the duty of the court
clerks is very unclear. Clearly they cannot rely on the statute,
but clearly they must exercise “reasonable steps” to give notice
to the owner. What are those? In Rosado the fatal flaw
was the failure of the clerk to check the current tax roll for
the updated address (which the tax collector also failed to do).
But while the clerk is checking that online, why can he or she
not take a few more minutes to search as would one "desirous of
actually informing" the owners, to use Justice Roberts’ words?
In this era of impressive online databases (including those of
the State of Florida), internet searches and people-finding
firms, what exactly are “reasonable steps” to find the current
address of a taxpayer who is about to lose his or her property
to a tax sale? When can a clerk safely say “enough is enough”
and proceed with the sale?
Tax deed sales appear to be declining in popularity in
Florida, as evidenced by the growing number of tax certificate
holders who simply sit on their investment and take no action
within the seven-year life of their certificate. Partially that
is due to the universal requirement of a quiet-title lawsuit by
the tax deed holder in order to gain marketable title. Partially
it is due to the throngs of bidders who tend to show up at
judicial sales, having bought the books and tapes on how to make
money in such real estate sales and whose presence lessens the
chance of any real “bargain” purchase.
Now that the holders of tax deeds have seen them invalidated
in cases such as Rosado and Jones, potential tax
sale bidders have the added worry as to whether their tax deed
will “hold up” if the defendants in the quiet title action
counter-sue and attack the validity of a process that did not
give them actual notice of the tax deed action.
Could we actually see a tax deed sale of valuable property at
which no one bids anything? That type of fiasco might put some
pressure on the legislature to adopt some clear notification
procedure that passes constitutional scrutiny.
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